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Abstract
Semi-Markov processes have proved to be an e_ective and con-
venient tool for constructing models of systems that achieve reliability
by redundancy and reconfiguration. These models are able to depict
complex system architectures and to capture the dynamics of fault
arrival and system recovery. A disadvantage of this approach is that the
models can be extremely large, which poses both a model construction
and a computational problem. Techniques are needed to reduce the
model size. Because these systems are used in critical applications
where failure can be expensive, there must be an analytically derived
bound for the error produced by the model reduction technique. This
report presents a model reduction technique called trimming that can
be applied to a popular class of systems. Automatic model generation
programs have been written to help the reliability analyst produce models
of complex systems. This method (trimming) is easy to implement and
its error bound easy to compute. Hence, the method lends itself to
inclusion in an automatic model generator.
Introduction models. These automatic model generators have in-
tensified the computational problem, since it is now
Reliable digital control systems are being de- possible to produce models of extremely complex
signed using redundancy and reconfiguration. The
systems.
reliability requirement for these systems can be ex-
tremely high. An example is the proposed require- Sound and effective procedures are needed for
ment that the flight control system for a commercial model reduction. Since these models describe sys-
aircraft have less than one chance in a billion of fail- tems that need to be highly reliable, an acceptable
ure during a 10-hour flight. Such requirements are model reduction method must have an analytically
beyond what can be established by natural life test- derived error bound. Since the model reduction
ing. An alternative method is to estimate the prob- method presented in this report is easy to implement
ability of system failure with a semi-Markov model and its error bound easy to compute, it lends itself to
that captures the elements of system architecture, inclusion in an automatic model generator. In fact,
component failure, and system recovery from failed it is currently being developed as a feature of the
components. The system architecture can be de- automatic model generator called ASSIST (ref. 1).
scribed by considering the components and how they We call the procedure model reduction by trim-
interact. The component failure rate is obtained from ming, or just trimming (ref. 2). In the next section,
field data. The description of system recovery from we illustrate trimming by means of a concrete exam-
failed components is determined from fault-injection ple. Then in subsequent sections trimming is pre-
experiments in the laboratory. These three features cisely defined, the theorem for the error bound on
(system architecture, component failure, and system trimming is precisely stated, and the trimming bound
recovery) can be studied separately and then com- is derived. Finally we show that not all models can
bined to form the reliability model for the system, be trimmed and still yield an accurate estimate of
Semi-Markov processes with their states representing reliability. It is essential to determine the error pro-
the states of the system and their transitions between duced by trimming.
states representing fault occurrences and system re-
coveries have proved to be an effective and convenient Illustrative Example
reliability estimation tool. This section uses a simple example to illustrate
A major obstacle is that a reconfigurable sys- the basic ideas of model reduction by trimming. This
tem of moderate size and complexity can generate example is not completely realistic in engineering
an enormous semi-Markov model, producing both terms, but it covers the ideas in a concrete manner.
a model construction problem and a computational Suppose a system consists of four central processor
problem. The model construction problem has be- units, four memories, and four buses. In the initial
come severe enough that computer programs have configuration, three components of each type are ac-
been written to automatically generate reliability tive while the fourth is a cold spare (with zero failure
rate). If a component becomes faulty, it is replaced memories will vote correctly. There is similar critical
by a spare. If the number of good processors, good coupling between the memories and the buses. There
memories, or good buses falls below three, then the is no critical coupling between the processors and the
entire system goes into a simplex configuration con- memories.
sisting of one processor, one memory, and one bus.
In this simplex configuration, the failure of any of the Part of the reliability model for this system is
three components causes system failure. The initial shown in figure 2. The failure rates for processors,
configuration, showing only the active components, is memories, and buses are Ap, AM, and IB, respec-
displayed in figure 1. In this initial configuration, and tively. For convenience, the system recoveries are as-
sumed to be constant-rate transitions with Fp, FM,in the subsequent configurations as a triad, each pro-
cessor (CPU) is assigned one bus to use for sending and FB being the system recovery rates for proces-
data to all three memories. Each memory (MEM) re- sors, memories, and buses. The states are denoted by
ceives data from all three processors. Similarly, each A for a fault-free state, R for a single-fault recovery-
memory is assigned one bus to use for sending data mode state, V for a multiple-fault recovery-mode
to all three processors. Each processor receives data state, and X and Y for system failure states.
from all three memories. To illustrate model reduction by trimming, con-
sider state Rp of figure 2 where one of the active
processors has become faulty. The recovery transi-
BUS A BUS B BUS C tion Fp removes this faulty processor and replaces
it with the spare. The transition 21p . 21B rep-
I resents the failure of another processor or of a bus[] that is critically coupled to the failed processor. The
state X represents system failure because of coinci-
•"_VJl=lLV_lr±-_
dent faults. The transitions 21M, "_M, and I B repre-
I sent fault arrival in components that are not critically|
coupled to the faulty processor. It seems reasonable
to think that these last three transitions and their
t (_I_L_(_ subsequent states can be ignored with negligible loss
of accuracy, because even after these transitions there
•,,v,,-4,v,r-_- must be another component failure before there is
system failure. We call such states as Rp recovery-
mode states. A recovery-mode state is a state with
a recovery transition out of it. Model reduction by
Figure 1. Initial configurationof processors, memories, and trimming eliminates all component failure transitions
buses, from recovery-mode states that do not cause imme-
diate system failure.
The system begins an operation cycle with the
active processors requesting data from the memories. Two models, complete and trimmed, were con-
Each memory (on its assigned bus) sends data to all structed for this system using the ASSIST reliability
three processors. Each processor votes on the re- model generator (ref. 3). The complete model con-
ceived data (i.e., the data from the three memories talus 227 states and took 7878 cpu (central process-
are compared to detect a fault should the data dis- ing unit) seconds to compute on a Digital Equipment
agree) and performs its calculations. After comput- Corp. VAX 11/750 computer. The trimmed model
ing, each processor (on its assigned bus) sends data contains 83 states and took 258 cpu seconds to com-
to all three memories. An operation cycle ends when pute on the same computer. Different methods of
each memory votes and stores the data. constructing a reliability model can produce equiv-
alent models with different numbers of states, but
Some critical coupling exists between the proces- the relative difference between the complete and the
sors and buses in the sense that the system can have trimmed model is thought to remain the same.
a coincident-fault failure when one fault is in a pro-
cessor and the other fault is in a bus. For example, For the parameter values,
suppose the processors are sending data to the mem-
ories with processor i using bus i for i -- A, B, C. If )_p = 10-4/hour Fp = 104/hour
processor A and bus B are faulty, then the memory )_M ----5 × 10-4/hour FM = 103/hour
voters can be overwhelmed by incorrect data. How-
ever, if processor A and bus A are faulty, then the IB ----10-5/hour FB = 103/hour
2
FB
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Figure 2. Reliabilitymodel for the illustrativeexample in figure1.
and an operating time of T = 1 hour, the complete The trimming bound gives an upper bound on the
model returns for the probability of system failure absolute error produced by trimming. The trimming
bound divided by the returned value for the trimmed
P(Failure of complete model) = 1.80803726 x 10-9 model gives an upper bound for the relative errorproduced by trimming. In practice, if this upper
bound for the relative error is small enough, then the
while the trimmed model returns trimmed model is acceptable. The amount of relative
error that is acceptable varies with the application,
P(Failure of trimmed model) = 1.80803714 x 10-9 but a relative error of 10 percent or less is usually
considered acceptable.
The absolute error produced by trimming is 1.2 x This practice (of considering only the trimmed
10-16. The relative error (absolute error/true value) model and the trimming error bound) can be il-
is 6.6 × 10-8, which is about 1 part in 10 million, lustrated for this example. As will be shown sub-
This example suggests that trimming significantly sequently, the upper bound for trimming error is
reduces model size and computational effort while
producing an insignificant amount of error. TRMBND ----Ol_(e OT -- OT - 1)
3
where Description of Model Trimming and
Statement of the Trimming Bound
maximum sum of the rates for the Theorem
failure transitions leaving any state
A common approach to achieving reliability is to
/_ largest average holding time for all have three or four components perform a majority
recovery-mode states vote. When a component becomes faulty and dis-
agrees with the majority, it is discarded from the
T operating time system and replaced by a spare if a spare is available.
There are two failure modes: (1) a coincident-fault
failure when the voter is overwhelmed because a sec-
For this example, ond component becomes faulty before a first faulty
component can be removed and (2) an exhaustion-of-
= 3,kp + 3,kM + 3_B parts failure when the number of good components
falls below a minimum level. Almost all fault-tolerant
= (3 x 10-4 + 15 x 10-4 + 0.3 x 10-4)/hour systems currently being considered are assemblages
of subsystems each of which is a majority-voting sys-
= 18.3 x 10-4/hour tem of .the type described above.
lz = 1IF M = 10-3 hour For this class of systems, a reliability model
has normal-operating states where all faulty com-
ponents (if any) have been removed from the sys-
since FM is the slowest recovery rate, and T = tern, recovery-mode states where a faulty component
1 hour. The computed bound on the trimming error has not yet been removed from the system, and ab-
is sorbing states where the system has failed because
TRMBND = 3.066 x 10-12 of coincident faults or exhaustion of parts. We ex-
amine the recovery-mode states more closely. There
This value of 3.066 x 10-12 is a bound on the are three types of transitions from a recovery-mode
absolute error produced by trimming. An upper state: (1)system recovery, (2)failure of another com-
bound for the relative error introduced by trimming ponent that causes immediate system failure (either
is coincident fault or exhaustion of parts), or (3) failure
of another component that does not cause immediate
Relative TRMBND system failure. Note that the third type of transition
error Trimmed model result is not a transition to a system failure state. Model
reduction by trimming is accomplished by removing
= (3.066 x 10-12)/(1.80803714 x 10-9) all transitions of the third type (and their subsequent
states) from the model.
= 1.7 x 10-3
Theorem: Suppose that
which indicates that this model can be trimmed with 1. Components fail at a low constant rate.
negligible loss of accuracy. Note that the relative
error for the upper bound of 1.7 x 10-3 is obtained 2. Fault recovery depends only on the time since
without using the complete reliability model. The fault occurrence.
decision to use only the trimmed model has been 3. The system is an assemblage of subsystems,
made on the basis of the results from the trimmed each subsystem achieving fault tolerance by a
model and the error bound for trimming, three-way or four-way majority vote.
The results for this example are typical for an 4. All transitions to system failure are compo-
application of trimming. The number of states in nent failure transitions. (This assumption
the reliability model is reduced by about half. The eliminates pathological cases.)
computational effort is reduced by about an order of For each state i in the reliability model let
magnitude. The actual error from trimming is in-
significant. The derived error bound for trimming is _i sum of the component failure rates
much larger than the actual error, but the derived er- out of state i
ror bound is still small compared with the computed
probability of failure for the system. _ maximum value among the _i
4
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Figure 3. General path in a semi-Markov reliability model.
pj average holding time in recovery- that depends only on the time elapsed since compo-
mode state Rj nent failure. A general path in such a semi-Markov
reliability model is shown in figure 3. The global time
p maximum value among the pj independence of a semi-Markov process permits the
T system operating time rearrangement of states on the path for notational
and computational convenience (refs. 4 and 5). In
Then an error bound for model reduction by trim- figure 3, small Greek letters represent slow constant-
ming is rate failure transitions, while capital roman letters
represent fast system recovery transitions. The first
TRMBND = _p(e eT- _T- 1) line in figure 3 contains the states (Ak) with only
slow constant-rate failure transitions (Ak and _'k). In
the second line are states (Bi) where the successful
Derivation of the Trimming Bound (on-path) transitions are the fast recovery transitions
(Fi,1) competing with slow constant-rate fault tran-
The error bound for model reduction by trim- sitions (_i)and possibly other fast transitions (Fi,bi).
ming is obtained from a theorem that places an up-
per bound on the probability of traversing a path in In the third line are the states (Cj) where the suc-
a semi-Markov reliability model by time T (refs. 4 cessful (on-path) transitions are the slow fault occur-
and 5). In such a model, the component failures are rences (aj) competing against one or more recoveries
assumed to occur at a low constant rate, and system (Gj,cj) and possibly other fault transitions (_j). For
recovery is allowed to be a fast, arbitrary distribution notation, let
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Figure 4. Path diagramfor the derivation of the trimming bound.
P(Fi) probability that Fi, 1 is successful failures can take the system immediately to system
failure. These component failures are represented by
p(Cj) average holding time in state Cj the transition co to the system failure state X. Other
considering only recovery transitions components fail with rates _1,--.,_i and take the
system to recovery-mode states R1, ..., Ri. From each
An upper bound for the probability of traversing the of the R states, the diagram displays the three types
path in figure 3 by time T is of transitions out of a recovery-mode state discussed
above. The € transitions into X are the component
n failures that cause immediate system failure. The
UB = YI "_k.____T I P(Fi)._.__l o_jp(Cj) (1) F transitions from recovery-mode states to fault-k=:l k i--1 free states represent the possible system recovery
actions. The _ transitions represent the component
The general model for using the algebraic upper failures out of a recovery-mode state that do not
bound in equation (1) to derive the trimming bound cause immediate system failure.
is shown in figure 4. This general model displays
all the paths to the possible system failure states After a _/ transition, three simplifying assump-
in a reliability model for the class of system that tions are made about system behavior:
we are considering. Since the model in figure 4 is
potentially infinite, it includes transient faults and 1. After a _/transition, the system is no longer able
their potentially infinite occurrences, to remove failed components from the system.
The system starts in state A0 which is a fault- 2. After a _/transition, any other component failure
free state. In this initial state, some component causes immediate system failure.
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3. This last transition (causing immediate system for traversing this path by time T is given by for-
failure) occurs at rate 0 which is the largest mula (1)as
possible rate for a transition to a failure state,
since O is the maximum sum of the failure rates UB ---(cqT)[P(Fi,j)] _i,j,k_ ('Ti,j,k,q_) 0out of any state. (6)
Summing over all the fans gives
All these assumptions increase the computed prob-
ability of system failure (compared with the actual [ T 3 ]probability of system failure). P(Y2) <-_/3_. _k _q. . _iP(Fi,j)J_i,J,k"/i,J,k,qpO-_.
Returning to the main sequence of component (7)
failure and system recovery, the F recovery transi-
tions out of the R states go to the fault-free B states T3 /
where the cycle of component failure and system re- P(Y2) -< 0/_-_-._. (_i [ z_. P(Fi,j)covery b gins again.
An upper bound is obtained for the probability (q_)]}
of being in state Y1 in figure 4 by considering all x _ _i,j,k "[i,j,k,q (8)
the paths to this failure state. One such path is the k
three-step transition from A0 to Ri by ai, from /74
to _,j by "ii,j, and from _,j to ]I1 by 0. An upper Since the sum of the failure rates is less than or equal
bound for traversing this path by time T given by to O, and the sum of the probabilities for the recovery
formula (1), the algebraic upper bound, is transitions Fi,j is less than or equal to 1,
US = (aiT)("/i,jlz) 0 (2) P(Y2) <-0/_ _.. (9)
where a slow failure transition competing with other In general,
failure transitions contributes the first factor, a slow Tk+lok+l
failure transition competing with recovery transitions P(Yk) < 0p _-__ _ (10)when the holding ti e in the recovery-mode state is
less than or equal to _ contributes the second factor,
and a second slow failure transition contributes the Summing all these bounds for the Yk's gives a trim-
third factor. Summing over the fan of transitions ming bound of
from A0 and the fan of transitions from the Ri's gives
TRMBND < Z P(Yk)
p(g )<_ (3)3 oo Tk+lok+l
= (k+1)!
P(Y1) _<
i = Olz(eOT - OT - 1) (11)
Since the sum of the failure rates out of any state is
less than or equal to 0, An Example With a Large Error Bound
A theorem on the error produced by trimming
T20 2
P(Y1) < 0p _.w (5) is necessary since trimming does not always have a
- negligible effect. Consider a system consisting of four
reconfigurable fourplexes. Each fourplex removes
A typical path from Ao to ]I2 has the five transi- itself from the system when the fourplex recovers
tions from Ao to Ri by ._i, from Ri to Bi, j by Fi,j, from the second fault occurrence in that fourplex.
from Bi, j to Si,j, k by !3i,j,k, from Si,j, k to Yi,j,k, q by The system fails by exhaustion of parts when all
"Yi,j,k,q, and from Yi,j,k, q to Y2 by 0. An upper bound four fourplexes have removed themselves from the
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system. A system coincident-fault failure occurs makes it easy to include in a program that generates
if any fourplex has a coincident-fault failure. In reliability models. This report has presented the
addition, all reconfiguration ceases if there are two simplest version of the error bound for trimming.
faults present in two different fourplexes. In this case Tighter bounds can be obtained by requesting more
the system fails upon the occurrence of a third fault information about the system being modeled. For
anywhere in the system. For a component failure example, the current bound does not require any
rate of 10-4/hour, a recovery rate of 103/hour, and information about system recovery from multiple
an operating time of 700 hours, the error bound for faults. Conducting the necessary experiments and
trimming is including this information in the derivation of the
error can produce a tighter bound. The price of the
TRMBND -- 1.5 × 10-6 tighter bound is the cost of the experiments.
The computed probability of system failure using a This method of model reduction is currently be-
trimmed model is ing developed as a feature of the automatic model
generator called ASSIST.
P(Failure trimmed model) = 7.05 × 10-7
The error bound for trimming is larger than the value NASALangley ResearchCenter
returned by the trimmed model. Hence, the the- Hampton, VA23665-5225
ory indicates that this model should not be trimmed. March 29, 1991
The computed probability of failure using the com-
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